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Italy:  
Delayed adaptation of social institutions  








Considering its very low fertility and high age at childbearing, Italy stands alone in the 
European context and can hardly be compared with other countries, even those in the 
Southern region. The fertility decline occurred without any radical change in family 
formation. Individuals still choose (religious) marriage for leaving their parental home 
and rates of marital dissolution and subsequent step-family formation are low. Marriage 
is  being  postponed  and  fewer  people  marry.  The  behaviours  of  young  people  are 
particularly alarming. There is a delay in all life cycle stages: end of education, entry 
into the labour market, exit from the parental family, entry into union, and managing an 
independent household. Changes in family formation and childbearing are constrained 
and slowed down by a substantial delay (or even failure) with which the institutional 
and cultural framework has adapted to changes in economic and social conditions, in 
particular to the growth of the service sector, the increase in female employment and 
the female level of education. In a Catholic country that has been led for almost half a 
century  by  a  political  party  with  a  Catholic  ideology,  the  paucity  of  attention  to 
childhood and youth seems incomprehensible. Social policies focus on marriage-based 
families already formed and on the phases of life related to pregnancy, delivery, and the 
first months of a newborn’s life, while forming a family and childbearing choices are 
considered private affairs and neglected.  
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1. Introduction  
The Italian demographic panorama is dominated by very low fertility, very high levels 
of life expectation, a negative sign of natural increase, and a positive balance between 
immigrants and emigrants, with persistent regional variability (Table 1). These features 
contribute to transforming the traditional image of Italian society, characterised by large 
families,  a  high  attachment  to  childbearing,  with  a  long  experience  of  emigration 
toward richer and more industrialized countries. 
 















Italy  1.33  77.6  83.2  9.7  9.8  -0.1  5.2 
North  1.32  77.7  83.5  9.6  10.2  -0.6  8.3 
Centre  1.28  78.1  83.5  9.4  10.4  -1.0  7.9 
South-
Islands  1.35  77.2  82.7  10.1  9.0  1.1  0.1 
 
Source: Our elaborations of  ISTAT data.  
a Birth rate – Mortality rate. 
b [(Total Immigrants- Total Emigrants)/Total Pop,]*1000. 
 
 
Indeed, ‘zero population growth’ considered desirable by many political parties 
after  the  Second  World  War  is  now  a  reality.  Only  thanks  to  a  positive  migration 
balance Italy’s population is not yet decreasing. If we compare the total population of 
1990 with that of 1 January 2005 (Table 2), we conclude that not much has changed. 
However, the composition of the population has changed entirely in terms of age and 
sex, and the proportion of the aged population has recently exceeded that of young 
people. Projections for the near future forecast a decline in the Italian population: Even 
though a recovery in fertility is hypothesized, a population decrease will be observed as 
well as an increase in aging (Figure 1).  
These  prospects  are  valid,  despite  the  expectation  of  a  net  annual  addition  of 
120,000 migrants. The phenomenon of immigration to Italy, though relatively recent, 
has now become crucial for the future of the population. According to official data
4 
(Caritas /Migrantes 2006), 3,035,144 foreigners lived in Italy on 31
 December 2005, 
constituting an increase of 9% compared to the previous year, and a 126% increase 
                                                            
4 Official data refer to an estimation on the basis of resident population by ISTAT and other information from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior Affairs.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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compared to 2000. The foreign population represents 5.2% of the total population, but 
the  whole  impact  of  migrants  on  Italian  demography  is  difficult  to  assess,  mainly 
because the life span spent in our country by most foreigners has been relatively brief.  
 
Table 2:  Population size and structure indicators, 1990-2005  
 
















1,1,1990   56,719   16.8   68.5   14.7   87.6  -  
1,1,2005 (a)  58,093  14.2   66.4   19.5   137.7  1.6 x 1000 
 




No  more  than  50,000  foreigners  have  lived  in  Italy  for  more  than  10  years. 
Nevertheless, we will speculate on the impact of migration on the population structure, 
which is rejuvenated by foreigners who are relatively young (Figure 2), and its impact 
on the number of births. Figure 3 shows a strong increase in the share of births due to 
foreign (resident) population on the total number of births (8.7% in 2004). However, the 
impact on the Italian fertility level appears insignificant: In 2004, the PTFR – calculated 
on the total resident population – was 1.33, while that of Italian citizens only was 1.26. 
At the same time caution is suggested while looking for the effect of migration on 
fertility, for different reasons. First, we expect foreign women and couples, even those 
from high fertility countries, to change their childbearing behaviour to that of the Italian 
model. Second, the first reason for immigration is the search for employment, even 
among women, and it is hard to reconcile this attitude with childbearing. Third, thus far 
the relative size of the foreign population is not large enough to produce appreciable 
effects  on  total  fertility.  Fourth,  the  ethnic  composition  is  very  heterogeneous,  i.e., 
consisting of many different nationalities and distinctive cultural and religious groups 
with different social and demographic structures and norms of behaviour, all of them 
living in the same country. As we look at estimated fertility indicators by nationality 
(Table 3), we notice, e.g., that while the mean age at childbearing among foreigners is 
lower than 30, regardless of the country of origin (the only exception being Peruvian 
women), the fertility levels differ very much among nationalities, and in some cases – 
e.g., the Philippines and Peruvian – are close to the Italian level.  
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Figure 1:  Italian population (in thousands) and percentage of people 





























% 60+  2005  2015  2025  2035  2045 
Low  25.6  29.9  36.0  43.4  46.7 
Medium  25.6  29.3  34.4  40.3  41.7 
High  25.6  28.8  32.9  37.6  37.3 
 
Source: ONU, 2005. 
Note: Low variant: recovery of fertility to 1,35 through the years 2040-45, 
Medium variant: recovery of fertility to 1,85 through the years 2040-45, 
High variant: recovery of fertility to 2,35 through the years 2040-45, 




For  the  time  being,  trends  in  childbearing,  even  the  most  recent,  have  to  be 
explained within the framework of the Italian population and society, with its culture, 
institutional, and economic structures, and the ambiguous net of relationships between 
family and the Welfare State. In the rest of the paper, we aim to illustrate at least the 
main  aspects  related  to  low  fertility  in  Italy,  starting  with  a  detailed  description  of 
recent childbearing trends.  
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Figure 2:  Age structure of Italian population, including foreigners,  
  1 January 2005  
























Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
Figure 3:  Percentage of foreigners out of total resident population  
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Table 3:  Fertility of foreign women, ten most represented countries  




% of female population 
(age 15-49 out of a 
total of 10 countries 
Mean age at 
childbearing 
TFR observed in 
Italy (a) 
TFR observed in the 
country of origin (b) 
Morocco  19.9  27.5  3.4  3.4 
Philippines  17.5  28.9  1.2  3.6 
Albania  16.1  25.7  2.7  2.6 
Romania  8.7  27.0  1.6  1.3 
China  8.5  28.1  2.4  1.8 
Peru  7.6  30.2  1.2  3.0 
Poland  7.1  26.9  1.8  1.5 
Tunisia  5.6  26.5  3.3  2.3 
Brazil  5.5  27.1  1.6  2.3 
Egypt  3.4  27.0  3.4  3.4 
 






2. A profile of low fertility  
The decline of fertility is depicted in Figure 4. The Period Total Fertility Rate (PTFR) 
fell below 2 children per woman in 1977, below 1.5 in 1984, and below 1.3 in 1993. In 
the following decade, the PTFR was relatively stable around 1.25. It is only in very 
recent years that we notice a slight increase in the level, which is, however, hardly 
interpretable as a convincing sign of recovery in childbearing, mainly if we read these 
data together with the continuous drop in completed fertility of female cohorts, from 
2.28 children per woman in the 1935 cohort to 1.49 for the 1965 cohort. 
The main features of this decline can be summarized as follows: first, a steady 
decrease  in  the  propensity  to  have  a  third  or  higher-order  child  and  a  more  recent 
declining propensity to have a second child; and second, the progressive delay in timing 
fertility, starting with the postponement of first childbirth, accelerating the decrease in 
period fertility levels. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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Period 1933 1943 1953 1963   1973 1983 1993 2003 2013
 
 
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the dramatic decrease of third and higher-order total fertility rates, 
but also a change in second-order fertility intensity due to cohorts of the 1950s and 
younger cohorts. The youngest female generation of reproductive age even began to 
refrain  from  having  a  first  child.  Indeed,  the  percentage  of  childless  women  is 
increasing: For the 1945 birth cohort, it stood at a mere 10.2% while it reached 20% in 
the 1965 birth cohort. As a result, the distribution of women by number of children born 
has changed significantly (Figure 6): Women born between 1930 and 1950 experienced 
a decline in childlessness and an affirmation of the two-child-family-model. This model 
is progressively becoming less attractive for subsequent cohorts. In the 1960 cohort, 
women with two children (37.2%) are outnumbered by the sum of mothers of an only 
child (20.5%) and of childless women (24.2%); the figure for large families - namely 
those with three or more children – stands at a mere 18.1%.  
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Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
Figure 6:  Distribution of women by number of children ever born (%),  
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Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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Figures of childbearing intensity have to be read together with the delay in the 
timing of fertility that we have been observing since the 1955 birth cohort (Figure 7). In 
the female cohorts born in the  late 1960s, the mean age at first childbirth is almost 27 
and  the  proportion  of  women  with  a  first  child  before  age  25  is  declining  with 
subsequent birth cohorts owing to a sharp decline in early-age specific fertility rates by 
cohort. Figure 8 clearly shows the decline in the level of fertility rates at ages 20 and 
25. A steady progress of childbearing postponement is evident among the cohorts of the 
mid-1950s  and  of  the  1960s.  Figure  9  depicts  the  differences  in  cumulated  cohort 
fertility, separately for first birth and second-order births, between women born in the 
years 1960–1980 and women of the 1950 reference cohort. At age 30, Italian women 
born in 1965 had on average .20 fewer first and second-order children than the 1950 
cohort. The difference in fertility level with respect to the reference cohort widens for 
younger women. At age 25, Italian women born in 1970 had .33 fewer first children, 
and it is likely that this difference further widened as the cohort reached its late 20s. 
The graphs also reveal the extent to which differences in fertility levels across cohorts 
are due to fertility postponement (Billari and Kohler 2002). The Italian 1960 cohort 
‘lagged’ behind the 1950 reference cohort and had on average about .13 fewer first 
births at age 26. When this cohort reached the late 20s and early 30s, however, the gap 
narrowed and fertility for first births partially recuperated; a similar pattern is observed 
for second-order fertility.  
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Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
 
The recovery in fertility after age 30 among cohorts born since the end of the 
1960s helps to explain the slight increase in period fertility recently observed and also 
suggests  that  a  ‘new’  behaviour  is  emerging,  characterised  by  childbearing 
postponement and recuperation. In the near future,  we do expect fertility to remain 
under the replacement level. In addition, it will be very important to understand the 
behaviours and intentions of the younger generations, namely those born in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Apparently their fertility is no longer declining compared to the 
1975 cohort. They are succeeding in having at least one child and possibly two (Rosina 
2004).  
A further aspect that should be mentioned with regard to the alarming trends and 
features of Italian fertility is its geographical heterogeneity. Differences in the level and 
timing of fertility still exist among regions. In the Centre and in the North there are 
higher levels of childlessness, more one-child families, and the highest mean age at 
childbearing, but a certain stability in trends. In the South, there is a prevalence of two-
child families and a relatively higher proportion of numerous families (Barbagli et al. 
2003).  However,  a  deep  convergence  in  fertility  levels  between  the  regions  can  be 
observed in recent years (Figure 10). One can argue that the fast decline of the total 
fertility level in the South will result in a further decline in fertility at the national level. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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Figure 9:  Cumulated fertility by birth cohort  
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Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
 
3. The proximate determinants of fertility  
The decline of fertility has occurred without any radical change in family formation. 
The  majority  of  households  are  still  formed  by  (married)  couples  with  or  without 
children. Any other forms of ‘modern’ living arrangements were practically nonexistent 
until the early 1990s due to the slow diffusion of informal unions, marital dissolution, 
and subsequent step-family formation. Some incipient signs of change in household 
distribution  by  typology  can  be  observed  in  the  very  last  decade  (Table  4):  The 
percentage of childless singles and couples is increasing - also due, importantly, to 
population ageing - as  well  as the  share of informal unions of the total  number of 
couples and the percentage of step families after divorce. The most important change, 
however, is the decline of marriage (Table 5). The number of marriages reached its 
lowest level in 2003 (4.5 marriages per 1000 inhabitants). The first marriage rate per 
1000 women younger than 50 years of age decreased from 1000 in 1961 to 580 in 2001, 
while the mean age at first marriage reached 27.0 at the end of the 1990s. An interesting 
trend is that the percentage of marriages celebrated by civil rite, quite insignificant until Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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the early 1970s, reached the value of 28.7% in 2003. The delay in marriage is related to 
the behaviour of recent cohorts, and this is affected by delayed leaving of the parental 
home  and  the  consequent  higher  age  at  marriage  compared  to  earlier  generations 
(Figure 11): The median age of leaving the parental home and that of marriage has been 
increasing ever since the 1954-58 birth cohort, both for males and females. 
 
 






















1994–1995  21.1 8.4 5.1 62.4  26.7 10.9 1.8 4.1
1996–1997  20.8 7.9 5.3 61.2  27.8 11.0 2.0 3.5
1998–1999  22.2 7.7 5.5 60.8  28.1 11.1 2.4 3.9
2000–2001  23.9 7.1 5.1 60.2  27.8 12.0 3.1 4.3
2002–2003  25.3 6.8 5.3 58.9  29.2 11.9 3.9 4.8
 
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
 
 
Table 5:  Marriage indicators, Italy, 1961-2003  
 
Year  Number 
Per 1000 
inhabitants 
% by  
civil rite 
First Marriage Rate 
(women <50) 
Mean age at female 
first marriage 
1961  397461  7.9  1.6  1000  24.7 
1971  404464  7.5  3.9  1003  23.9 
1981  316953  5.6  12.7    760  23.8 
1991  312061  5.5  17.5    670  25.7 
1993  302230  5.3  17.9    660  26.0 
1995  290009  5.1  20.0    630  26.6 
1997  277738  4.8  20.7    600  27.0 
1999  280330  4.9  23.0    600  27.0 
2001  264026  4.6  27.1    580   
2003  257880  4.5  28.7     
 
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data. 
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Figure 11:  Median age at leaving parental home and marriage  




















Source: Barbagli et al, 2003. 
 
 
Uncompleted  Second  Demographic  Transition  has  been  recalled  as  one  of  the 
reasons why fertility is so low in Italy compared to Central and Northern European 
countries, namely because non-marital fertility has not replaced the decline and delay in 
marital  fertility  (De  Sandre  2000).  Although  increasing,  the  share  of  births  out  of 
wedlock is not higher than 14% and the great majority of children are still born to 
married couples.  
It can be argued that the Second Contraceptive Revolution (Leridon 1987) has yet 
to take effect in Italy, which is another puzzling feature of the Italian paradox in family 
behaviours. The very low fertility level has been reached by means of theoretically low-
effective contraceptive devices (Table 6). Until the end of the 1970s, 58% of married 
women aged 18-44 relied on the method of coitus interruptus; in 1996 the same was 
true for 34% of married women and 12% of singles, and, while the younger cohorts 
increasingly rely on modern contraception, male-coitus-related methods - namely the 
use of condoms and withdrawal - are still more popular than the pill, especially among 
married  and  cohabitant  couples  (Dalla  Zuanna  et  al.  2005).  Notwithstanding,  the 
number of induced abortions, which was relatively high at the beginning of the fertility Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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transition, reaching 200,000 per year at the end of the 1970s, steadily declined in the 
following 20 years, between 1983 and 2003 falling from 17.2 to 9.6 per 1000 married 
women aged 15-49. In this period, all age-specific abortion rates declined, with the 
exception  of  the  fertility  rate  of  women  younger  than  20  years  of  age,  which  is 
relatively stable around 5-6%. In 2004, however, the gross rate of abortion slightly 
increased (9.9 abortions per 1000 women at ages 15-49)  mainly due to the  foreign 
immigrant population, which, on the whole, shows an abortion rate equal to 35.5 per 
1000 (ISTAT 2006). 
To conclude, instead of being responsible for the decline of fertility, Italian birth 
control behaviour can be viewed as resulting from a lack of modernity, which, as we 
discuss in the following sections, is viewed as a main cause of the current depressed 
childbearing level. 
 









1979 married   9  58  13  4  13  3  100  18-44  4,493 
1996 couples  6  34  25  9  24  2  100  20-49  1,750 
1996 singles  2  12  32  3  51  1  100  20-49  558 
 
Source: Dalla Zuanna et al, 2005. 
 
 
4. Explaining low fertility in Italy: micro and macro determinants  
The determinants of fertility decline in Italy have been explored thoroughly (Ongaro 
2002; Salvini 2004) and can easily be reconciled with the socio-economic and cultural 
changes that occurred in Western industrialized countries after the Second World War. 
Economic approaches
5 (Bernhardt 1993) as well as the cultural explanations
6 (Van de 
Kaa 1987) are consistent with the empirical analysis of the individual life histories of 
Italian women. In a recent paper (Kertzer et al. 2006), a comprehensive overview of the 
most  prominent  explanations  of  low  fertility  in  Italy  and  an  analysis  of  panel 
longitudinal survey data have been presented as parts of a project on Explaining Low 
Fertility in Italy. The individual data analysis of the transition to first and second child 
                                                            
5 Economic approaches focus on increased female autonomy, the entry of an increasing number of women 
into the labour force, and calculations of the direct and indirect costs of childbearing (Bernhardt 1993). 
6 Cultural explanations, namely the diffusion of individualism and secularization, have been incorporated into 
the Second Demographic Transition theory for a better understanding of the persistent decline of fertility and 
its relationship with family changes (Van de Kaa 1987)   De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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largely confirms that both the main factors chosen -- the economic approach (woman’s 
labour-force participation) and the secularization one (married in a civil union) -- play a 
significant and strong role in delaying or even discouraging women to have a (further) 
child, with all the other characteristics controlled for. Also, the predictive meaning of 
these two factors does not prevent the regional and cohort effects being meaningful. 
Younger cohorts, namely women born between 1961 and 1970, have lower rates of 
transition to a first and second child compared to earlier generations. Women living in 
the  South  of  Italy,  i.e.,  those  regions  with  a  lower  rate  of  female  labour-force 
participation  and  a  lower  percentage  of  civil  marriages  out  of  total  unions,  show  a 
higher  risk  of  having  children  and  shorter  birth  intervals  than  their  counterparts  of 
Central Italy and the country’s North. 
Once the two levels of observation – individuals and residential units – have been 
integrated into a proper multilevel modelling framework (Bernardi and Gabrielli 2006), 
the role played by women’s work and religiosity is confirmed at both levels: Being in a 
religious marriage increases a woman’s propensity to enter motherhood and to have a 
second birth earlier, while being employed depresses both transitions. The inclusion of 
the contextual level variables does not modify the effect of individual characteristics, 
but the regional random effects are statistically significant, indicating that the intercept 
of the individual model varies over contexts. Also contextual factors have a significant 
effect, though they impact on the timing of second birth and on first birth in different 
ways: Living in a suburban or a non-urban area increases the probability to become a 
parent  but  it  has  no  effect  on  the  second  child;  living  in  an  area  where  female 
employment is common considerably depresses the likelihood to become a mother and 
to have a second child earlier. The level of religiosity has no effect on first birth, while 
time-to-second-child  is  significantly  shortened  in  contexts  where  attending  Catholic 
Mass is more widespread. 
These  results  are  in  line  with  a  previous  multilevel  analysis  on  total  expected 
fertility of Italian women aged 20-49 in the mid-1990s (Borra et al. 1999) based on a set 
of micro variables (age, marital status, education, the number of siblings, employment 
status of both partners, religious attendance, type of union) and three macro indicators 
derived from a synthesis of macro variables through a principal components analysis 
(1
st  component:  degree  of  economic  and  social  development,  labelled  as 
‘modernisation’, 2
nd: level of urbanisation, 3
rd: secularisation). The individual variables’ 
effects  were  as  expected.  But  much  more  interesting  was  the  possibility  to  see  the 
contextual effects at  the  municipality level.  As  usual, those in the southern regions 
(along  with  some  regions  of  the  North-East,  such  as  Friuli  Venezia  Giulia)  have  a 
context that raises fertility. The opposite applies to the northwest, some central regions 
and in Sardinia. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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However,  these  results  do  not  help  to  explain  the  striking  contradiction  in  the 
relationship between very recent childbearing trends and macro-economic and cultural 
differences observable at the regional level. Since one of the most notable features of 
recent  trends  in  Italian  fertility  is  a  tendency  toward  convergence  of  fertility  rates 
between  the  North  and  the  South,  this  is  not  accompanied  by  any  convergence  in 
women activity rates and in the spread of secularized behaviours. In a more detailed 
analysis, some regional specificities emerge, such as the case of Basilicata, situated in 
the South: In 2003, the total fertility rate stood at 1.20, i.e., it was below the national 
average, but the female labour-force participation rate was among the lowest in Italy, 
with only 46% of women aged 25-34 in the labour force, and only 9% of marriages 
celebrated outside church (Kertzel et al. 2006). 
Even more difficult to reconcile are results observed at the micro level as well as 
the national lowest low level of fertility and low female labour-force participation rate 
with the perception of Italy as one of the most traditional, Catholic, and family-oriented 
countries among the Western societies. 
Several studies have aimed to understand and to explain the particular position of 
Italy in comparison to other European countries. De Rose and Racioppi (2001) found 
that the analysis of the individual determinants of Voluntary Low Fertility (VLF: choice 
of  having  0  or  1  child  at  most)  benefits  integration  with  contextual  conditions 
influencing  individual  choices  and  the  decision-making  process.  Women  with 
homogenous individual and family characteristics have different fertility expectations 
based  on  their  country  of  origin,  just  because  their  respective  countries  differ 
demographically,  socially,  economically  or  culturally,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  their 
gender  system.  VLF  decreases  in  those  contexts  where  the  welfare  state  is  more 
supportive to women and families and where there is a more balanced gender system. 
Moreover, with a focus on Southern Europe, we compared Italy, Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal, using a multivariate approach (De Rose and Racioppi 2004). The four 
countries are similar in many respects – they have reached the lowest level of fertility 
worldwide within a very short time; the marriage rates have decreased, divorces and 
cohabitations  are  not  yet  common,  but  there  are  differences  in  socio-economic 
indicators. From this analysis we conclude that Southern Europe has a homogeneous 
demographic  system  but  is  relatively  heterogeneous  with  regard  to  other  societal 
characteristics.  Yet,  the  closeness  between  Italy  and  Spain  with  respect  to  socio-
economic and cultural variables that affect sexual, family, and reproductive behaviours 
(e.g.,  the  strong  association  between  age  at  first  sexual  intercourse  and  religious 
attendance) becomes clear. 
As  an  important  source  of  variability  among  countries,  the  different  level  of 
institutional support to family and fertility is usually examined. Accordingly,  fertility is 
expected to be higher in those countries where the government offers programs that De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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make women’s work and childbearing more compatible (Rindfuss et al. 2003). Again, 
the case of Italy appears as contradictory. The provision of publicly funded childcare, 
maternity leave, and tax benefits are all better in Italy than what is available in the USA 
or  UK,  yet  there  the  level  of  fertility  is  significantly  higher.  Not  surprisingly, 
Engelhardt  and  Prskawetz  (2004),  looking  at  trends  in  OECD  countries  over  time, 
conclude:  “Trends  in  the  variables  that  would  be  representative  for  the  role 
incompatibility hypothesis and the ease in combining work and child-rearing…cannot 
be related to the trends in fertility.” 
In  conclusion,  all  of  these  factors,  though  playing  an  important  role  in  the 
explanation  of  the  decline  in  Italian  fertility,  are  not  sufficient  to  understand  its 
persistence at such a low level. Many scholars are exploring different paths of  research 
that, on the whole, support the fundamental idea that the peculiar interaction between 
economic  and  structural  changes  and  the  nature  of  family  ties  in  Italy  leads  to  a 
different  development  of  fertility  and  household  dynamics  with  respect  to  those 
included  in  the  Second  Demographic  Transition  (Billari  and  Wilson  2001;  Micheli 
2004). In the following, we argue that the substantial delay (or even failure) with which 
society has adapted to changes in individual attitudes and behaviours and in the quality 
of the relationships between genders and among generations is forcing men and women 
toward a very low fertility level.  
 
 
5. Societal conditions impacting fertility and family  
What is peculiar in Italy is the speed with which post-war social and economic changes 
have taken place, namely concerning the growth of the service sector, rising female 
employment, and the increase in the level of education. The change has been very fast 
(within  two  or  three  decades),  but  the  social  structure  has  remained  static  in  many 
respects as regards the organisation of the family, the school system, and women’s time 
schedule  of  work.  “In  the  last  40  years,  Italian  families  have  changed:  the  typical 
middle-class family with the husband as breadwinner and the wife totally devoted to the 
home, with a clear separation of the social tasks of the spouses, has quickly vanished 
(…). Italian society has been more reluctant than elsewhere to adapt to the pressures of 
economic and cultural change.” (Dalla Zuanna 2004). This is a fundamental key to 
understanding why the level of fertility remains so low and why no clear sign of a 
reverse trend is yet observed, despite the fact that the ideal number of children is always 
definitely higher than effective fertility. The 1996 Fertility and Family Survey shows an 
almost  entirely  generalised  desire  to  have  children:  98%  of  the  20–29-year-olds 
interviewed  declared  that  they  wanted  children.  On  average,  the  desired  number  of 
children is 2.1 and the desire to have children remains unaltered even in more recent Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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generations and even for women who have made large investments into their education 
and want to achieve their career aspirations.  
Many distinctive interrelated aspects need to be discussed when refering to the 
‘failed societal adaptation’. 
 
 
5.1 Lack of labour market flexibility  
Women  and  young  people  face  an  inflexible  labour  market  and,  in  an  adult  male 
dominated society, adjustments  have been taking place  very  slowly and reluctantly, 
despite greater investment in human capital through enrolment in education. The data in 
Table 7 show an increase in the proportion of people aged 15 or above with a university 
or a higher-secondary degree, both comparing younger versus older ages and comparing 
women versus  men. Moreover, if one compares trends of the  number of  university 
graduates per 100 individuals above age 25 by gender (Figure 12), it is evident that 
women  obtained  better  results  than  their  male  counterparts  and  that  the  gap  is 
increasing among the younger student cohorts. 
 
 
Table 7:  Population aged 15 and over by educational level, age and gender,  





degree and diploma 
Senior secondary 




school certificate  
Primary school 
certificate 
  Males Females  Males Females  Males Females  Males Females  Males Females 
25–29    11.3  16.4  46.1  49.3  6.3  5.4  32.6  25.7  3.7  3.2 
30–34    13.0  18.4  36.4  39.1  6.8  7.0  39.3  31.4  4.5  4.1 
35–39    11.8  14.2  32.2  34.5  7.8  8.8  42.0  36.5  6.2  6.0 
40–44    11.3  11.5  30.1  30.9  7.0  9.1  44.5  39.0  7.1  9.6 
45–49    11.0  11.2  30.9  25.9  6.9  9.1  38.5  34.4  12.6  19.3 
50–54    11.5  10.4  25.1  19.7  6.5  6.7  35.4  30.2  21.5  33.0 
55–59    9.7  7.7  21.3  14.6  5.6  5.0  29.8  23.3  33.6  49.4 
60–64    7.9  4.4  17.3  11.5  3.5  3.5  24.8  19.1  46.4  61.5 
65+   5.5  2.2  9.8  6.3  1.9  1.7  17.0  11.2  65.7  78.7 
Total  8.7  8.4  27.3  25.1  5.4  5.3  35.3  27.9  23.3  33.3 
 
Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004. De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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Figure 12:  University graduates per 100 individuals age 25 and over  





















Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the labour market is more favourable to men than it is to women, 
even  among  university  graduates.  In  fact,  whatever  the  educational  level,  the 
employment rate is higher for men than it is for women (Table 8). Employment rates for 
Italy, including a comparison with the EU, show a persistent disadvantage of Italian 
women and a high level of unemployment among young people. The figures in Table 9 
highlight the peculiarity of the Italian employment system: Compared to the average of 
European men, Italian employment rates are higher in the middle age groups and much 
lower  in  the  young  and  in  the  elderly  age  groups;  the  gender  gap  in  Italy  is 
comparatively higher than in all European Union countries, especially for younger and 
older  age  groups.  The  disadvantage  of  women  is  documented  also  by  professional 
segregation  (Table  10).  Women  who  work  ‘at  the  top’  as  managers  or  politicians 
constitute a minority and they are highly underrepresented in that category, while they 
prevail in the executive categories of the tertiary sector. Gender inequalities in income 
are also documented. Women earn 30% less than men on average and the gender gap is 
significant also when controlling for job characteristics, though decreasing by level of 
qualification (Addis 2006; OD&M 2006). However, this does not discourage young Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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women who, instead of staying home and dedicating themselves to childbearing, prefer 
to invest in education and professional training; this leads to a further delay in family 
formation. Employed women, especially those married and with children, face a very 
rigid working-life organisation, mainly with regard to time schedules of work, making 
it difficult for many of them to reconcile work activities with family life. Despite a 
relatively  generous  maternity  leave  programme  (see  below),  many  working  women 
complain  about  the  lack  of  flexibility  in  time  organisation  (ISTAT  2004).  Not 
surprisingly, then, among working mothers the activity rate of those aged 25-34 and 35-
44 steadily decreases with the number of children, while no such change is observed for 
men  (Table  11).  One  form  of  flexibility,  namely  part-time  work  options,  has  been 
introduced recently.  Italian workers, however, both male and female, take advantage of 
this opportunity to a lesser degree than the rest of the EU (Table 12). In countries such 
as Italy, where the option of part-time work is still very limited, its effect on fertility 
may be ambiguous. The results of a recent comparative study (Del Boca et al. 2004) 
using European Community Household Panel data (ECHP) show that, when controlling 
for all personal, family, and available environmental contexts, Italian women still work 
significantly less than women in France and the UK. If Italian women had access to the 
same number of part-time positions as women in the UK, their participation would 
increase by 52.5% and the fertility rates would decrease by 2.8%. In a country where 
part-time work is rare, married women are forced to choose between not working and 
working  full-time.  The  growing  availability  of  a  third  option  would  change  the 
available set of choices: If unemployed women chose to work part-time, their fertility 
rates  might  decline.  By  contrast,  if  full-time  working  women  chose  to  reduce  their 
working schedule, their fertility might increase. The net effect on fertility depends on 
the magnitude of these different flows. 
Women,  however,  look  at  part-time  employment  as  an  important  resource  to 
reconcile work activity with the family (Del Boca 2002). In 2003, around 70% of part-
time working mothers declared to have chosen this form of employment in order to be 
in a better position to take care of their children. 
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Table 8:  Employment rates by educational level and gender, 2004  
 
Educational level  Males  Females 
Primary school  25.6  8.0 
Junior secondary school  61.0  33.3 
Vocational qualification  76.7  55.9 
High school  69.4  53.7 
University   78.4  70.6 
Total  57.4  34.3 
 
Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004. 
 
 
Table 9:  Employment rates by gender and age in Italy and EU, 2002  
 
EU  Italy 
Age groups  Males Females Total Males Females Total 
15–19  25.7 21.2 23.5 11.6 6.9 9.3 
20–24  61.0 52.1 56.6 46.7 33.4 40.0 
25–29  80.9 67.2 74.1 71.6 52.1 61.9 
30–34  88.4 68.3 78.5 86.5 58.3 72.5 
35–39  89.9 68.8 79.4 91.5 58.4 75.1 
40–44  89.5 70.3 80.0 91.8 57.0 74.5 
45–49  88.4 68.6 78.5 91.5 54.0 72.7 
50–54  83.0 60.4 71.6 81.3 42.4 61.7 
55–59  66.0 43.9 54.8 53.1 26.3 39.4 
60–64  32.8 16.3 24.3 29.3 8.1 18.3 
65+  5.5 2.1 3.5 6.1 1.3 3.3 
 
Source: ISTAT, Ministero per le Pari Opportunità (2004)- "Come cambia la vita delle donne", Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
Table 10:  Professional composition of employed men and women, 2004  
 
Professions  Absolute numbers (in thousands) 
  Males  Females  Total  
Members of legislative bodies, managers & entrepreneurs  808    255  1063 
Intellectual, scientific & highly specialized professions  1238  1023  2261 
Intermediate professions technical experts  2335  2057  4392 
Administrative & management executives  1038  1493  2531 
Sales and household services  1637  1883  3520 
Craftsmen, skilled workers & farmers  3597    672  4269 
Plant & machinery operators, industrial assembly-line workers  1651    398        2049 
Non-skilled workers  1064    997   2061 
Armed Forces  253       5     258 
Total (in thousands)  13622  8783  22405 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2004 (ISTAT,2006). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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Table 11:  Employment rates of parents aged 25-64 by number of children,  
  gender and age, average 2004 (percentage values) 
 
Males  Females 
Number of children  25–34  35–44  45–54  55–64  25–34  35–44  45–54  55–64 
One child  92.8  94.9  88.3  43.3  55.1  66.3  52.0  19.8 
Two children  90.9  94.1  89.9  52.6  38.9  54.4  50.6  25.0 
Three children  84.6  90.7  87.5  55.5  25.9  37.5  40.0  23.3 
Total  91.8  94.0  88.9  47.9  46.7  55.5  49.6  21.6 
 
Source: Elaboration on ISTAT data (Labour Force Survey 2004). 
 
 
Table 12:  Percentage of part-time employed in Italy and in the EU  
  by age groups and gender, 2002  
 
Italy  EU 
Age groups  Males Females Males Females 
25–34  4.2 17.5 4.7 26.7 
35–44  2.5 19.8 3.4 36.8 
45–54  2.7 13.5 3.8 33.6 
55–64  3.5 16.7 6.0 33.1 
 
Source: ISTAT, Ministero per le Pari Opportunità (2004)- "Come cambia la vita delle donne". 
 
 
5.2 An unbalanced gender system  
Women have to cope with an unbalanced gender system in the family. Combining work 
activities with childbearing and other family duties, including taking care of elderly 
relatives,  is  entirely  left  to  women’s  adaptability.  McDonald  (2000)  suggested  that 
fertility has fallen especially in societies and social groups where the public gender 
system has evolved evenly, while the private gender system (i.e. of the couple) has 
remained attached to  more traditional asymmetries. In Italy, too, during the  last 40 
years, the public gender system changed in an even sense: Women now have access to 
any profession, they achieve a higher educational level than men, and, when employed, 
they work almost as hard as men, especially before entering motherhood. At the same 
time, however, the couple’s sharing of housework is heavily unbalanced – not only 
when the woman is a housewife (in the traditional logic of ‘job sharing’), but even 
when  she  works  full-time.  Women  need  to  and  want  to  work  in  order  to  avoid  an 
income reduction as well as a loss of role and identity. At the same time, spending long De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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hours on household chores, without any significant help from the husband, contributes 
to making low fertility more than a choice. 
The very low percentage (14%) of employed fathers out of the total number of 
parents taking parental leave is a good indicator of the low engagement of male partners 
in family duties. Moreover, the percentage of exits from the labour market due to family 
issues is greatly differentiated by gender (Figure 13). Over 60% of women but less than 
20%  of  men  do  so  at  ages  40-44.  The  youngest  male  cohorts  appear  to  be  more 
available to take care of their children and 52% of them declare to be interested in 
taking parental leave, provided that their employer allows them to do so.  
 
 
Figure 13:  Exit from labour market because of family duties  





















Source: Centra M. (2003), Modelli di mobilità: ciclo vitale e partecipazione al mercato del lavoro in Battistoni L, Op, Cit. 
 
A low level of fathers’ involvement in child care is another distinctive feature of 
the Italian gender system. No more than 25% of fathers of children less than 5 years of 
age are involved in the care of them. Again, the younger couples (i.e. unions formed in 
the 1990s) appear to be more egalitarian, with the respective male partners being much 
more collaborative (ISTAT 2005). Using Fertility and Family Surveys data in different Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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countries, including Italy, Pinnelli and Di Giulio (2003) estimated that couples with 
relatively  small  gender  differences  with  respect  to  age,  education,  and  work 
involvement have the highest fertility. At the individual level, the fact that a married 
working woman receives some help from the husband when looking after their children 
or performing household chores has some significant and positive impacts on  the risk 
and timing of second or third births (Mencarini and Tanturri 2004; Cooke 2003) and 
also affects her fertility intentions (Pinnelli and Fiori 2006). 
 
 
5.3 The ‘delay syndrome’  
Another distinctive feature of the Italian situation is the rigidity with which individual 
and contextual factors affect the various stages of the life cycle: end of education, entry 
into the labour  market, exit from the  family, entry into union, and formation of an 
independent household. Closely related to this rigidity, and simultaneously a cause and 
an effect, are the ‘costs’ of leaving the parental home. Of 100 young people aged 18-34, 
the fraction of those living in the parental home increased between 1993 and 2003, both 
for males and females, from 62.8% to 66.3% and from 48% to 52.9%, respectively. 
Various explanations have been given, such as the high cost of housing and young adult 
unemployment  (Saraceno  2000).  None  of  these  are  convincing,  because  also  the 
fraction  of  young  Italian  adults  living  with  parents  and  in  full-time  employment  is 
rising, from 47.7% to 53.4% among males and from 34.2% to 37.4% among females 
(Table 13). Moreover, young adults admit that they like to live in the parental home, 
where they typically pay almost nothing for their upkeep, have their mother doing all 
their cooking and washing, and can spend money on cars, vacations, and discos instead 
(Sgritta 2001; Palomba 2001). 
Compared  to  other  countries,  young  people  in  Italy  do  not  show  any  of  the 
flexibilities of young people in other European countries when they leave the family 
home to go and live on their own, to study, to work, and above all to live with their 
partner and have children (Billari and Rosina 2004). The delay in forming a family at a 
relatively late age may lead, for various reasons, to not having children at all or to 
reduced fertility due to being strongly accustomed to a certain lifestyle (Livi Bacci and 
Salvini 2000). 
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Table 13:  Young people (18-34) not in union, living with their parents,  
  by gender and condition 
 
Year  Employed Searching for a job Housewife
(1) Student  Other
  Male 
1993  47.7 22.1 - 25.3  4.9
2003  53.4 16.3 - 26.1  4.2
  Female 
1993  34.2 22.4 6.0 36.0  1.4
2003  37.4 19.1 2.5 39.3  1.8
 
Source: Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie “Aspetti della vita quotidiana” Year 2000,  ISTAT 2005. 
(1) This includes not active young people caring after the house. 
 
 
5.4 Too much family  
The last social collective process which, we believe, helps to maintain the gap between 
desired and actual fertility in Italy is the persistence of strong ties between parents and 
children. Parents invest a lot in their (only) child and a very high cost-value is attributed 
to these children, which in Italy is shouldered entirely by the family. Not having a 
second or third child seems to be resulting from the fear of lowering the child’s quality 
of life, who is highly protected by its parents. Moreover, as the children’s prospects of 
social mobility have been low or nonexistent for a long time, Italian families show little 
enthusiasm to push their children ‘out of the family nest’. In Italy, proximity parameters 
between children and parents are strong: Young adults leave home later and later and, 
when they go, they often reside nearby, and visits between parents and children are very 
frequent (Dalla Zuanna 2004). The persistent proximity between parents and children 
favours  intense  exchanges  of  all  kinds  between  the  generations:  Parents  support 
children until they leave the parental home and help them financially in buying a flat or 
a house and in organising the very expensive (religious) marriage ceremony; they also 
are expected to become good grandparents; children in turn will ensure emotional and 
material sustenance for their parents when they become elderly.  
The consequence of these factors is that young people in general seem to live in a 
context that is characterised by strong family ties, and it does not favour independent 
life choices. This may also help to explain why the welfare system is ungenerous with 
families that have children: In a society centred on family ties, there is little room for 
the state. A very instructive example is the use of childcare services. In Italy, the vast 
majority of children aged 3-5 attend nursery school, a proportion as high as, or higher 
than,  that  found  in  many  other  European  countries  with  higher  female  labour-force 
participation rates. However, according to ISTAT data collected in 1998, only 8% of Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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Italian children aged 0-2 went to public day care and, in 2002, 56% of all women then 
in the work force who had given birth between July 2000 and June 2001 had their 
babies cared for by the babies’ grandparents while they were out to work. Thus, the lack 
of public services offering child care is partly due to a low demand for these services 
owing to a strong cultural bias against the practice to send the smallest children outside 
the home.   
Families tend to solve their tensions by themselves; therefore, institutions are not 
particularly  pressed  to  intervene.  Given  this  strong  orientation  towards  the  ‘private 
value’ of children, it is difficult to recognize their ‘collective value’ (Livi Bacci 2001).  
 
 
5.5 Too much Church and too little religiosity  
The causal link between Catholicism and marital and reproductive behaviour is not easy 
to establish. On the one hand, is the function of the Church in public life as a cultural 
and political institution; on the other, the influence of religious feelings and the set of 
values  on  private  affairs.  Despite  the  large  influence  on  public  life  exerted  by  the 
Catholic  Church  through  the  dominant  political  party,  the  Democrazia  Cristiana, 
through the end of the 1980s, many liberal laws were approved by a large and diverse 
parliamentary majority during the 1970s: a divorce law in 1970, a law passed in 1971 
permitting contraceptive advertising, a reform of norms regulating family relationships 
in 1975, and a law legalising abortion in 1978. In many cases, the political battles were 
very hard. 
During the 1990s, Democrazia Cristiana was swept away by corruption scandals; 
other minor Catholic parties were founded on the left and right of the political spectrum 
but  their  political  power  cannot  be  compared  to  that  of  the  previous  period. 
Nevertheless, the influence of the Catholic Church on public issues is still notable. For 
example, a law on medically-assisted reproduction approved by the Italian Parliament 
in 2003 contains significant restrictions based on Catholic principles: The intervention 
is permitted only for married couples without resorting to any outside sperm or ovule 
donors. Also, the current discussion on the legal status of informal unions is strongly 
influenced by the Catholic parties. In general, public life and the institutional setting are 
constantly influenced by the Catholic ethical viewpoint.  
The same contradiction is evident when we look at individual behaviour. In the 
mid-1990s, 97% of people aged 18 and older declared themselves to have been baptized 
into the Catholic Church; however, no more than half of them regularly participated in 
religious rites. The participation is even lower among young people, especially men 
(Table 14). As far as family life is concerned, Italian people are far from following the 
prescriptions  of  the  Church,  neither  on  sexual  and  contraceptive  behaviour  (as De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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mentioned above) nor on spousal behaviour. Separation and divorce are continuously 
increasing  as  well  as  informal  unions,  especially  among  the  youngest  generations. 
Similarly with respect to fertility: Expectations and ideals are influenced by religious 
principles, but actual choices and behaviours are impacted much less so (Dalla Zuanna 
2004). The persistent influence of the Church at a political level contributes to delays in 
the spreading of modern behaviours, which might lead to an institutional and cultural 
context favourable to childbearing. 
 
 
Table 14:  Persons aged 6 and over by frequency of attendance at a  
  place of worship and by age and gender (per 100 persons  
  of the same age and sex) - Year 2003  
 
Once a week (at least)  Never 
Age group  Male  Female  Male  Female 
6–13  59.5  63.8  7.7  5.7 
14–17  30.9  43.9  15.3  12.3 
18–19  19.3  29.7  23.5  13.5 
20–24  13.7  25.7  27.3  16.8 
25–34  16.3  27.8  23.3  15.0 
35–44  18.9  33.5  21.0  12.2 
45–54  21.9  41.3  19.2  9.8 
55–59  25.1  48.2  17.9  7.9 
60–64  32.0  55.0  15.6  7.2 
65–74  38.3  59.8  15.6  7.4 
75 +  36.8  48.7  21.4  19.0 
Total  27.1  42.9  19.0  11.6 
 
Source: Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie “Aspetti della vita quotidiana” Year 2003, ISTAT 2005. 
 
 
6. Family policies  
Fertility trends have been clear for a number of years and demographers have tried to 
draw attention to them. However, public concern for policy reform is very recent, and 
strongly related to the fear of the consequences of low fertility, namely the crisis of the 
pension system and in the context of growing foreign immigration. 
The two preceding governments (1996-2001; 2001-2006) and the present one have 
directly addressed this question, but the overall context is still unfavourable in terms of 
persuading women and men to have the number of children consistent with their desires Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
http://www.demographic-research.org   693 
and ideals. First, compared to other European countries public transfers to families and 
children are not generous. Second, the societal context in which children are raised is 
not child-friendly in terms of time use, mobility, and public spaces. Third, the need of 
women and mothers (and fathers) to reconcile their activities inside and outside the 
family is largely unmet. Fourth, the late transition to adulthood in Italy heavily depends 
on the  functioning of the education  system, that of the labour  market, and housing 
arrangements.  
A brief description of the main measures currently effective follows.  
 
 
6.1 Financial support  
6.1.1 Indirect financial support  
Working people are allowed fiscal deductions for both children and other dependent 
relatives, including the no-income marital partner; until 1998, the rate of deduction was 
higher for the spouse (namely the wife) than for children, thus discouraging married 
women from entering the labour market. Since 1998, the rate of deduction for children 
has been substantially increased, matching the level for spouses. 
 
 
6.1.2 Direct financial support  
There is no generalized form of income transfer to the family. All transfers are linked to 
the family and the individual’s income. 
Family allowance, is granted only to employed, unemployed, and retired people 
with very low income; the amount depends on the number of family members and the 
family situation (it is higher for a single-parent family or for a family member with a 
handicap). 
Maternity allowance of 250 Euro per month for 5 months, established in 1999, 
which is given to the mother whose family income is relatively low (lower than 25,800 
Euros annually). It is now given also to foreign women. 
Family allowance for three or more children, is 103 Euro per month granted to 
large families with an income close to the poverty threshold. 
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6.2 Social policies favourable to work-family reconciliation  
6.2.1 Maternal leave  
Maternal leave is compulsory and lasts 5 months, to be taken prior to or after delivery, 
depending on the woman’s choice. In exceptional cases, it can be granted to the father 
instead of the mother. The woman has the right to maintain her job and she receives no 
less than 80% of her salary (paid by social security). This measure was introduced in 
1971 only for employed women; in 1987 it was extended to self-employed women and 
in 1990 to highly skilled professionals (lawyers, medical doctors, architects; etc.); more 
recently it was extended also for women with a temporary job. 
 
 
6.2.2 Parental leave  
According  to  a  recent  law  (8  March  2000  n.  53),  parental  leave  is  voluntary  and 
provides the right for fathers as well as mothers to stay home for 6 months each until 
the child reaches the age of 8; the job is preserved and they receive 30% of the salary 
(80%-100% if they work in the public sector). Law no. 53 provides the father with the 
legal right by choice to take care of his child, even when his spouse (or partner) is a 
housewife or is self-employed. Employers receive some fiscal benefits if parental leave 
(especially for male employees) is not discouraged. Some positive effects of this law on 
fathers’ participation in childcare have already been observed. 
 
 
6.3 Flexibility of the labour market  
Both the law mentioned above and the more comprehensive law on work flexibility, 
passed  in  2003,  introduced  many  fiscal  and  monetary  incentives  to  employers  who 
allow for some forms of flexibility such as part-time employment, flexible working 
hours,  shift  work,  job  sharing,  and  remote  work.  These  possibilities  have  not  been 
proposed to directly affect childbearing but they could be family friendly, if used not 
only in the employers’ interest, but also in the interest of workers and their family. 
 
 
6.4 Child care services  
As  observed  above,  social  service  provisions  for  families  with  young  children  are 
largely insufficient. There are very few kindergartens for infants aged 0-2 (in 2000, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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only 7.4% of children aged 0-2 attended kindergartens, and attendance concentrated 
mostly in the northern-central regions). In 2002, the government approved and partially 
financed  a  number  of  projects  for  kindergartners  in  many  private  workplaces.  The 
service is fee-paying, and the charge depends on parental income. In larger cities, such 
as Rome, the kindergarten calendar starts on 1
 September and ends on 30 June, offering 
a full day of service, from 7:00 to 18:00. 
The supply of private and public schools for children aged 3-5 is much broader. In 
the school year 2000-01, 100% of children aged 3-5 attended school. The organisational 
model of the public childcare schools may vary from town to town and, partly, from 
school to school. The service is free of charge; a contribution can be required for the 
school canteen and transport. The opening date is established by the regional school 
calendar and the closing date is usually 30 June. In the larger cities, parents can choose 
between two timetables: morning classes — from Monday to Friday, 8:00 - 13:20 — 
and full time classes — from Monday to Friday, 8:00 -  17:00. 
 
 
6.5 Policies of the present and recent past concerning population and family  
The poor development of family policies in Italy captured by the Mediterranean Model 
–  whose  features  have  been  depicted  in  the  present  chapter  –  can  be  explained  by 
historical, political, and ideological reasons: 
A very long tradition of strong family ties, weak public institutions, and territorial 
differences;  
A  family  model  with  traditional  and  patriarchal  relationships  some  of  which 
continue to this day; 
The experience of fascism: For the first and only time in Italy, during the 1930s 
and early 1940s, explicit demographic and family policies were pursued to increase the 
birth rate, to strengthen the authority of the ‘husband – father’, and to subordinate the 
family to the political objectives and to the principles of the regime;  
The strong belief (only recently weakened due to awareness-raising campaigns of 
demographers) that Italy was already over-populated and that therefore a policy aimed 
at an elevated birth rate was not needed. 
The lack of an explicit family policy in Republican and democratic Italy ever since 
the war can be partly explained by citing the fascist heritage and the need to distance 
oneself from its demographic policy objectives. Moreover, it is worth adding the post-
war conflict concerning family values among the political and cultural forces that has 
been  lasting  to  date  (Saraceno  2003),  with  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Catholic-
inspired party, Democrazia Cristiana, aiming at protecting the unity of the family on 
the one side; and the Marxist-inspired political forces (Communist and Socialist Parties) De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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and the anti-clerical-liberal-oriented forces aiming at promoting individual freedom and 
rights (radical and liberal parties) on the other. 
Moreover, one should take into account that until the 1960s, many services for 
children and the elderly were directly or indirectly managed by the Catholic Church, 
which sought to keep control over this field, thus hampering the development of public 
services. 
However, in the 1970s, there was a brief period when public social services for 
women  and  families  were  being  developed.  This  was  the  period  of  rising  female 
employment, of the feminist movement, of some local left wing administrations, of the 
left-centre wing governments. In the late 1970s, the Catholic Party and the Communist 
Party  briefly  compromised  on  some  issues  (the  so-called  ‘historical  compromise’). 
During this period, the state nursery schools for 3-5 -year- olds was instituted (1969), 
together with the municipal kindergartens for children up to 3 years of age (1971). 
Other  important  issues  of  this  period  were  measures  concerning  compulsory  and 
optional maternal leave for employed women (1971), the divorce law (1970), the new 
family  legislation  (1975)  establishing  legal  equality  between  husband  and  wife  and 
between  legitimate  and  extra-marital  children,  the  institution  of  family-planning 
services  (1975),  a  law  on  equal  gender  opportunities  in  the  workplace,  which  to  a 
certain extent allows even fathers to receive optional leave (1977), a law introducing the 
legalization of abortion (1978); and the institution of the national health system (1978).  
With these measures, the period of expanding public services in Italy came to an 
end. In the 1980s, the crisis of the Welfare State began, a financial and structural crisis 
that continues to date. 
 
 
6.6 A short overview of the major political parties’ position on fertility issues and 
policies  
The  policymakers’  awareness  of  the  importance  of  policies  supporting  families, 
especially those with children, is relatively recent and dates back to the second half of 
the 1980s. Only in this period did political parties start considering enacting laws to 
deal  with  family  behaviour.  Such  laws  would  also  aim  at  supporting  fertility,  but 
through different modalities and tools, according to the different ideological trends.  
To sum up, we can highlight four main objectives: 
 a)  supporting  families  through  social  services,  mainly  aimed  at  children  and  the 
elderly; 
 b) supporting reconciliation between family and working commitments and supporting 
gender equality; 
 c) an opposition to abortion, and support of maternity; Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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 d)  the  reform  of  the  family  tax  system,  aimed  at  reducing  taxes  for  families  with 
children. 
The first two objectives have been promoted by left-wing parties and left-wing 
local administrations; the remainder have been advanced by the Democrazia Cristiana 
and by right-wing parties, e.g., the Italian Social Movement (MSI), according to the 
various declarations made by the political parties on family issues.  
During the electoral campaigns of 1994, 1996 and 2001, family policies gained 
importance in the programmes of the party coalition (left-centre camp and right-centre 
camp) and the issue of supporting fertility assumed higher prominence in both camps. 
In these years, family support was one of the main issues in the political debate. 
According to the right-centre camp to be achieved by financial help and reduced taxes 
for families with children. The left-centre camp demanded financial support for families 
as  well  as  the  introduction  of  measures  aimed  at  reconciling  family  with  working 
commitments,  such  as  a  wider  application  of  parental  leave  (following  a  European 
Union regulation issued in 1996) and the development of services for children. 
Another  topic  of  interest  was  the  recognition  of  unmarried  heterosexual  and 
homosexual  couples,  strongly  opposed  by  the  right-centre  parties.  The  left-centre 
coalition  widely  agrees  on  the  need  of  these  unions  to  be  recognized,  even  if  a 
distinction  between  heterosexual  unions  and  homosexual  unions  is  highly 
recommended.  
What can be seen as the very first family policy in the recent period dates back to 
the  first  “Ulivo”  government  (left-centre  coalition,  1996-2001).  A  great  number  of 
interventions  were  made  in  the  social  service  management  system,  in  the  field  of 
financial support for families, and to reconcile family and working commitments.  
Among  the  initiatives  supporting  fertility  and  introduced  by  the  right-centre 
government (2001-06), a bonus of 1000 Euro for any second or higher-order birth was 
introduced. This option was not available in 2004 and 2005 owing to a lack of funding, 
but was re-introduced in 2006 for first order births.  
The newly elected government (in office since April 2006) headed by a left-centre 
coalition promises a great wealth of measures to establish a net of citizenship rights that 
are individual and family-centred
7. The main objectives are: 
To promote two types of basic freedoms for young people: becoming independent 
from their parents and being able to start their own family. 
To support women’s right to work, without renouncing maternity. 
To reconcile work and family life. 
To solve the housing problem. 
These are some of the measures suggested by the government: 
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6.6.1 To reconcile work with personal and family life  
-  To promote the option of paternal and maternal leave.  
To increase the amount of income from parental leave. 
To integrate current income with an anticipation of the end-of-job alimony. 
 
 
6.6.2 Educational services for children and families 
Increase national and regional public resources to establish a network of high-quality 
educational and integrated services for children, aimed at promoting the development 
and health of children and in supporting parents’ reconciliation of work with child care 
and education. 
Increase the accessibility of kindergartens to all families who request a place in 
such an institution, through means-tested subsidies. 
 
 
6.6.3 Investing in the future: an allowance for each child, a deposit account for 
each young boy or girl  
Two measures aimed at supporting each newborn and each young boy or girl nearing 
independence: 
The first measure aims to recognize the social value of motherhood and paternity, 
giving each child an income that provides financial help for the family until the child 
reaches age 18. It is an allowance supporting family responsibilities and represents an 
addition to the family income. This allowance increases with the number of family 
members, irrespective of the parents’ working conditions. The support is mainly aimed 
at low and average income families. 
The second measure provides a principal for each newborn and can be used at the 
age  of  18.  The  idea  is  that  the  state  opens  an  individual  deposit  account  for  each 
newborn, increasing it with annual contributions (even with the support of the family) 
until he/she is 18 years old. At this age, the young person may use the money to pay 
university  fees,  to  pay  for  professional  training  or  to  invest  into  company  start-up 
activities.  The  principal  will  be  repaid  at  no  interest.  Similar  deposit  accounts  are 
opened for children who were younger than 17 years of age at the time when the law 
was issued. 
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6.6.4 Solving the housing problem  
Provide the option of loans for the first home of young couples and establish a special 
bond fund, designed to facilitate repayment of the loans. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
The main idea we aimed to develop in this paper is that the very low fertility level in 
Italy  is  strongly  related  to  the  delayed  and  limited  diffusion  of  modern  family  and 
partnership behaviours, which are in turn slowed by the lagged adaptation of Italy’s 
institutions to social change. The Italian story, in fact, is a story in which cultural, 
economic, and religious forces have interacted to produce an environment in which 
bearing only one or two children is the outcome for most couples, even though fertility 
intentions might have been considerably higher. The numerous obstacles for the young 
in entering adult life and, at the same time, society’s reluctance to accept new forms of 
living arrangements alternative to marriage make people delay or renounce entering a 
union and forming a new household. Also, the gender system, which apparently favours 
maintaining a traditional family system, is not compatible with a situation in which 
more  and  more  women  reach  a  higher  level  of  human  capital  and  are  increasingly 
stimulated to enter the labour market, even as a consequence of population ageing.  
In a society where it is the family which is expected to find the resources it needs 
(both  material  and  immaterial),  and  where  both  men  and  women  are  expected  to 
participate in the labour force, social policies are scarcely adequate to support families 
with  children  and  to  promote  further  fertility.  The  main  effort  is  addressed  to  give 
financial support, even if the amount is very low and limited to a minority of very low 
income  families.  Other  interventions,  which  may  be  useful  in  the  process  of  role 
reconciliation, such as childcare public services, increased labour market flexibility, a 
convincing promotion of more equal gender roles, and male involvement in family care, 
are woefully inadequate. 
Recent significant legislative innovations, such as the reform of the school system 
and of universities, and the measures aimed at enhancing the flexibility of the labour 
market will certainly have some impact on families and young people’s behaviours, but 
the direction this will take is questionable. A once only (una tantum) financial support 
to childbearing is likely to have only a short-time effect, however it demonstrates the 
concern for persistently low fertility in Italy. Finally, the lack of a serious discussion on 
recognizing the right to informal and homosexual unions (except for a very recent bill 
introduced in February 2007 to be  discussed in the Parliament), on the approval of the 
restrictive  law  on  medically-assisted  reproduction,  and  the  recurrent  attacks  by  the De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour 
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Catholic parties on laws legalizing divorce and abortion are aspects that confirm the 
extent  to  which  Italian  society  still  resists  the  diffusion  of  individual  and  family 
behaviours that could be consistent with a childbearing recovery. 
Some signs of modern behaviour, both in partnership and contraception, can be 
seen in the cohorts born after the  mid-1960s. Among these cohorts, cohabitation is 
spreading, civil marriages are more common, sexual relationships are more egalitarian 
and they increasingly rely on modern contraception. The younger cohorts also witness 
postponement  and  recuperation  of  childbearing,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  a 
definitive  rise  in  fertility  can  be  expected  if  the  framework  of  societal  and  policy 
conditions remains unchanged. Without a serious effort by Italy’s political parties to 
dismantle  at  least  some  of  the  barriers  for  the  young  and  for  women,  fertility  will 
remain low for a long time. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 19 
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